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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented ait the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 





























































































































































































The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
constitutes the most tangible piece of evidence of the new 
assertiveness of the directly elected European Parliament so 
far. In Altiero Spinelli's own words, the European Parliament 
decided to assume, on behalf of the citizens which had 
elected it, the task of preparing and proposing a wide- 
ranging reform of the Communities after having realized 'the 
obvious impossibility of overcoming the glaring contradiction 
between the needs of Europe and the ability of Europe run by 
the Council to respond to these n e e d s '.(1)
There is widespread agreement that most of the 
shortcomings of the EC are due to the inadequacy of its 
institutions and it is quite understandable that such a 
staunch Europeanist as Spinelli should devote so much of 
effort to a proposal largely centered on institutional 
reform. Whether such effort will eventually produce adequate
* Although the conclusions and general approach of this paper 
have been elaborated jointly, Luciano Bardi is principally 





























































































results is thus a question which first and foremost requires 
an assessment of the institutional provisions included in the 
Draft Treaty.
Any assessment of institutional architecture, especially 
if still only on paper, is a task that requires a high degree 
of speculation. Institutional blueprints always present 
numerous gaps and undetermined aspects which may produce 
results sharply contrasting with those originally envisaged 
by the draftsmen.(2) In the case of the Draft Treaty such an 
assessment is made even more difficult by the rather oblique 
and imprecise way in which the desirable end results are 
expounded by Spinelli. One can only deduce that Spinelli, 
convinced of the inadequacy of the Council's decision-making, 
envisages an institutional structure attributing more 
decisional power to the genuinely supranational bodies of the 
EC to the detriment of those expressing intergovernmental 
decision-making patterns.(3) If greater supranationalism 
should provide the solution to most EC problems, such a broad 
statement does not allow for an assessment of the internal 
consistency of the set of institutional provisions contained 
in the Draft Treaty. Besides problems stemming from defects 
of institutional blueprints in general and of the Draft 
Treaty in particular, further analytical difficulties are to 
be found in the attempt to come to grips with the (dynamic) 




























































































number of institutions have been known to evolve in such a 
way as to acquire scope, importance and powers going well 
beyond those specifically provided for in those systems' 
constitutions.
Very little can be done to fill out the gaps and to 
clarify the gray areas in the Draft Treaty. To the extent to 
which such a task remains unsuccessful, the assessment of the 
Draft Treaty's institutional provisions will have to rely on 
a high degree of speculation. But the other two sets of 
problems mentioned above can hopefully be circumvented more 
satisfactorily.
Spinelli's motives may be assumed to be based on what 
could be considered an objective assessment of the 
performance and, inevitably, of the shortcomings of the EC 
and its decision-making institutions. But 
institutionalization, that is the process whereby 
institutions acquire their position in the political system, 
can be measured at various points in time on the basis of 
objective criteria. As a matter of fact, institutionalization 
presents another, internal, aspect; that is the development 
in an organization of those characteristics that will permit 
it to become externally institutionalized vis-à-vis other 




























































































Huntington and Nelson Polsby agree that institutions should 
be adaptable, autonomous, reasonably differentiated from 
their environments and complex.(4)
An evaluation of the present institutional balance of 
the EC should provide us both with an idea of the 
shortcomings the Draft Treaty would presumably aspire to 
eliminate and with a measure of the degree of 
institutionalization reached by each relevant EC body under 
the present Treaties. Such findings could be projected in the 
light of the specific provisions of the Draft Treaty. An 
assessment of the institutional provisions of the Draft 
Treaty would thus depend on what institutions should prove to 
have the greatest potential for further institutionalization. 
Our attention will be mostly devoted to internal aspects of 
individual EC bodies' institutional development. But each 
institution's internal development will have external 
consequences affecting all the others. The political 
development of the system as a whole will depend on the 
overall balance of relationships in the EC institutional 
circuit, and in this light our study of individual 
institutions is to be understood.
Institutionalization theory has been conceived having in 
mind the political development of the nation-state. 
Considering that the proposed Union in many ways resembles a 




























































































provided by the theory. The peculiar nature of the incipient 
European Political system,however, suggests a distinction 
between two different sets of the criteria proposed by 
Huntington and Polsby. A highly institutionalized body in the 
European political system should score highly on all four, 
but while two of the criteria, complexity and adaptability, 
can be seen as indicators of an institution's potential 
capability to perform 'tasks of authoritative resource 
allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement and so on', 
the other two criteria, autonomy and differentiation from 
environment, could also indicate an institution's propensity 
to act as a truly European, that is, supranational, rather 
than as an intergovernmental decision-making b o d y .(5)
2) THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
a ) General problems
The institutional set-up of the EC has suffered from a 
number of general problems, largely attributable to defects 
in the original design. It is not our intention here to 
proceed to a systematic evaluation of the malaise of the EC. 
But a quick overview is necessary for the continuation of our 
analysis. As others have convincingly pointed out, the 
evolution of the EC has been severely hindered by the 




























































































flexibility normally characterizing constitutions, the Treaty 
made it impossible for the EC to develop beyond a certain 
point. Even if 'there is some movement in the joints of the 
Treaty, permitting interpretation and institutional evolution 
... the very length and specificity of the European document 
compounds the fact that it is a treaty requiring unanimous 
approval for change', thus making it 'different from a 
document that allows change to be made in it only with the 
support of a large majority of its constituent members'.(6) 
Such rigidity is in open contrast with the need for 
flexibility implicit in the functional and neofunctional 
principles embedded in the Treaties.
Individual theories of integration have failed 
adequately to predict and explain the evolution of the E C . (7) 
Some of the major problems afflicting the EC and its 
institutions, however, can be explained by considering the 
limits of the functionalist principles that informed the 
original communitarian design. Contrary to the hopes that 
interest aggregation would more and more often take place at 
the European level (as the formation of European Trade Union 
federations would indicate), national interest groups are 
protecting and entrenching themselves rather than overlapping 
(as the sad reality of wine and fish wars is showing), thus 
contributing to the endless disputes among the Member State 
governments. The original intention to protect the 




























































































resulted in a division of the policy-making process along 
functionally determined lines, involving the competent 
branches of the national bureaucracies and ultimately 
strengthening the nation-state.(8)
Moreover, whatever spill-over effect has indeed taken 
place, enlarging the scope and augmenting the import of EC 
activities, it has also underlined the problem of legitimacy 
within the Community. Commissioners are individually 
appointed by the member governments while the Commission as a 
whole is subject to the censure of the European Parliament. 
The prospect of the possible transfer of important 
prerogatives to a virtually unaccountable supranational 
institution has contributed greatly to the strengthening of 
the Council and to the entrenchment of the unanimity 
principle. Ever since the Luxembourg compromise, unanimity 
has been the rule, and the few instances in which majority 
votes have been taken in the Council to overrule individual 
members' paralyzing vetoes must be considered as sporadic 
exceptions. The rationale behind all this would be that 
unanimity makes each member government responsible, and 
accountable to its Parliament, for each Council decision. The 
re-introduction of majority vote would create a 'democratic 





























































































The trend in favour of intergovernmental decision-making 
was also reinforced by 'protective' reactions of governments 
to the monetary, energy and general economic crises of the 
seventies, culminating with the official incorporation of the 
European Council as a Community institution in 1974. The 
enlargement of the Community, as well as the continuing 
economic difficulties experienced by all member countries, 
brought to the fore another major problem of the Community, 
that of 'own resources'. The Community has 'a right to its 
own resources, but it (has) no clear right to resources which 
(are) adequate to perform those tasks which (have) been 
required of it'. The Community therefore lacks autonomy and 
its proper functioning totally depends on supplementary 
allocations decided by the Council and ultimately by the 
member states.(10)
Last, but not least, as pointed out in the Committee of 
Three Report on European Institutions, EC decision-making has 
been affected by the 'general phenomenon of an excessive load 
of business aggravated by slow and confused handling (which) 
may be summed up in the one French word lourdeur'.(11) Such 
administrative inefficiency, probably originated by the 
decline of the institution best equipped to expedite 
technical procedures, the Commission, found a ratchet in the 
relationship of interdependence existing among the various EC 
institutions and the consequent need for several revisions of 




























































































All of the factors listed above, while having a general, 
and mostly negative, impact on EC decision-making, have 
produced diverging effects on individual institutions. But 
one could also argue that the course of events could at least 
partially depend on the characteristics of the single 
institutions involved and that an institutional explanation 
of the present situation of the EC can be attempted. In order 
to do so, we shall examine in closer detail the Commission, 
the Council of Ministers with its spinoff and ancillary 
bodies, and the European Parliament, trying also to assess 
the degree of institutionalization of each institution. As 
for the other major EC institution, the Court of Justice, the 
only problem seems to be, according to the Three Wise Men, 
the preservation of its perfect independence. The Court, 
therefore, will not be specifically considered in this paper.
b ) The Commission
In the Treaty of Rome, the Commission was conceived as a 
genuinely supranational body, designed to be the 'motor' of 
the Community. According to the Treaty, the Commission was 
meant to be the initiator of Community policy and guardian of 
the Treaties, as well as a mediator among the Member States 




























































































All commentators agree that, after an initial period 
during which the Commission carried out its tasks competently 
and efficiently allowing for the successful take-off of the 
Common Market, there has been a steady and considerable 
decline in its powers and function-performing capabilities, 
to the point that now the Commission often prepares proposals 
actually initiated elsewhere (The European Council and 
Council of Ministers on all extra-Treaty policies). Applying 
to the Commission the Huntington-Polsby model, which measures 
adaptability on the basis of an institution's age, in the 
sense of its acquired ability to attract new functions, one 
must attribute the Commission a very low score on this 
criterion.(12 )
The Commission was sufficiently well equipped to perform 
the tasks neatly outlined in the Rome Treaty. But as soon as 
challenges (of an economic, technological, and even social 
and environmental nature) arose from sectors outside the 
official blueprint of the Treaty, the Commission was unable 
to respond. The lack of autonomy the Commission has in 
disposing of, let alone acquiring, its own resources can 
certainly be considered a very severe handicap which has 
progressively hindered the Commission's performance even in 
areas designated as the Commission's domain in the Treaty of 
Rome. If the unwillingness of the member governments to give 
up additional portions of their sovereignty was probably an 




























































































was also partially due to the Commission's structural 
deficiencies. In other words, the Commission is not 
sufficiently complex to be able to move into new policy 
areas. This might sound like a paradox given the large number 
of Directorates General, Directorates and other sub-units 
into which the Commission is divided. But even so, as we have 
seen, the Three Wise Men tell us that the Commission is 
overloaded; it simply has too much work to do in its 
multifunctional position as initiator of Community policy, 
mediator, administrator and guardian of the Treaty. On the 
other hand, as the various subdivisions of the Commission are 
determined by the total number of Commissioners and Director 
Generals the Member States are entitled to, they do not 
respond to its actual task-performing needs. As pointed out 
in the Spierenburg report, there is 'an imbalance in the 
importance of the various portfolios (and the) distribution 
of staff between DGs does not accurately reflect the growth 
of departmental burdens'. Many of the sub-units tend to 
perform a single function, usually dealing with highly 
technical aspects pertaining to a single policy area, often 
overlapping with the work of other sub-units belonging to 
different DGs. In conclusion, also considering that 
communication within the Commission mostly occurs vertically 
and almost never horizontally, not only is the Commission 





























































































The Commission's lack of legitimacy 'has certainly 
prevented it from moving into new areas to maintain progress 
and meet fresh challenges' once 'the detailed guidance 
contained in the Treaties was gradually exhausted'.(13) As 
pointed out by Ernst B. Haas, the concept of legitimacy 
hinges on participation/representation and performance.(14) 
Through the early years of the Community the Commission drew 
its legitimacy from the representativeness of the member 
governments, the signatories of the Treaty. There is enough 
evidence that, with the possible exception of the honeymoon 
period that followed the Treaty of Rome, the investiture 
given the Commission by the member governments was 
conditional on the preservation of some means of national 
control. The national quota system with which Commission 
officials are selected, even if considered to be non- 
influential in terms of the behavior of individual 
Commissioners, certainly has an impact on the institutional 
integrity of the Commission. At least one-third of the very 
important A1 positions (mostly Director Generals) is filled 
by 'parachuting' outsiders, generally national civil 
servants, directly into the position, while the number of 
Director Generals who work their way up from starting 
positions below A3 is very small. The reasons and some of the 
implications of this situation are clearly stated by Stanley 
He ni g:
It has always been considered undesirable for 




























































































over a particular sector of policy making. 
There is a general rule that a Commissioner 
and his director general will be of different 
nationalities and also a broad understanding 
that normally directors and directors general 
to whom they work will be from different 
countries. This also applies to heads of 
division and directors. Since each country 
wishes to preserve its share of these senior 
posts, procedures for the filling of vacancies 
may be cumbersome. Unless there is to be a 
redistribution between nationalities involving 
potential upheaval in a number of D G s , 
vacancies at A3 level and above have to be 
filled by somebody from the country to whom 
the post 'belongs'. This frequently 
necessitates outside recruitment at the behest 
of that country even if suitable internal 
candidates of other nationalities are 
available. Where posts are filled by internal 
promotion, merit will only be one factor to be 
taken into account. The career pattern of an 
A7 entrant may well be limited to a rise to A4 
unless he or she is lucky enough to win what 
amounts to political patronage.(15)
According to another student of EC bureaucracy the co­
optation of national officials into the- decision-making 
process presents 'a major challenge to the institutional 
identity of the Commission'. Many such officials see their EC 
appointment as 'a useful interlude in their national career', 
and, working mainly in technically specialized committees and 
sub-committees involving representatives of the member 
countries, never develop a sense of belonging to a European 
civil service.(16) Their mid-career entry, frustrating the 
aspirations of young 'European' officials might indeed 
contribute to the decline of the performance (and legitimacy) 
of the Commission. All of these considerations warrant for




























































































coherence/boundary definition criterion proposed by the 
Huntington-Polsby model.(17)
c ) The European Council, the Council of Ministers and 
COREPER
Given their mostly intergovernmental characteristics, 
the European Council, COREPER, and the Council of Ministers 
can be considered, at least for analytical purposes, as one 
institution. Indeed COREPER and the European Council can be 
seen as responses of the Council of Ministers to shortcomings 
of the institutional set up of the E C . (18)
The Council, in its various ministerial manifestations, 
has been expanding its policy-making and even policy- 
initiating powers chiefly to the detriment of the Commission. 
In a parallel fashion a number of accessory institutions have 
been created (Secretariat) or reinforced (COREPER), giving 
the impression that the Council itself is becoming a 
permanent European institution capable of giving continuity 
and long-term perspectives to EC policy making. In order to 
do so, the Council still needs the cooperation of the 
institution best equipped to expedite technical procedures, 
that is the Commission. But Council decision-making is also 
deeply affected, both in scope and efficiency, by its need to 




























































































to standing or ad hoc working parties, set up by either the 
Council itself, or COREPER or even the Special Committee on 
Agriculture. Such working parties have an enormous importance 
in determining the intergovernmental nature of EC decision 
making. According to Christoph Sasse their 'de facto autonomy 
... leaves them free to determine which decisions reach the 
political (COREPER - Council) level'. Despite, but maybe 
because of, this seldom acknowledged importance of working 
parties, they are often staffed with home-based experts with 
very little familiarity with EC methods and propensity for 
compromise. The desire of some working-party members to 
preserve unchanged the national position can considerably 
delay or even prevent the reaching of decisions.(19)
The cumbersome decison-making processes, now almost 
exclusively centered on the Council in its various forms 
(Council(s) hereinafter), being based on lengthy preparatory 
stages in ad hoc or standing committees at various levels, 
and involving long bargaining sessions amongst its own 
members and always requiring the mediation of the Commission, 
are a reflection of the institutional ambiguity of what has 
now become the most powerful EC institution.
In many respects, from the point of view of the would-be 
European political system, the Council(s) are non­
institutions. They are even less autonomous and coherent than 




























































































are directly controlled by the Member State government to 
which their members individually belong. Even the various 
ancillary organizations, such as COREPER and the whole host 
of ad hoc or standing committees and working parties, pre 
mostly staffed with national civil servants all holding very 
different views as to what is to be done and how to do it.
But the very same national governments and civil 
services, which may be at least partially responsible for the 
disappointing performance of the Community in recent years, 
bestow upon the Council those sources of strength which the 
Commission sorely lacks. The Council(s) derive from the 
national parliaments, to which their individual members are 
accountable, the legitimacy to act in any policy area in the 
national (as part of E P C ) or in the communitarian interest, 
with or without the rubber stamp of the Treaty. In this the 
Council(s), although meeting sporadically and in various 
personnel permutations, have shown remarkable adaptability 
exploiting the resources of national diplomatic traditions 
and also creating new structures to perform some of the newly 
acquired t a s k s . The wide scope of the powers of some of the 
Council(s) and the interchangeability of some of the 
Ministers involved have also given them a sort of albeit 
discrete functional complexity.(20)
Looked at as integral parts of the national governments 




























































































officials also belong, the Council(s) and related 
organizations even have a high degree of autonomy and 
coherence, even if resulting from compromise among peers.
d ) The European Parliament
The European Parliament has been termed 'not much of a 
parliament' and is much more often mentioned for the powers 
it lacks than for the powers it does h a ve .(21) Formally the 
EP has budgetary powers, control over the executive, a 
legitimizing function and some legislative powers. In 
practice, however, despite direct elections, such powers 
remain rather limited.
Parliament's budgetary powers are formally the most 
important of all, but in practice they amount to much less 
than commonly believed. Being only on the expenditure, and 
not the revenue, side, they have very little impact on 
policies. Even the power to reject the budget as a whole has 
only minor practical consequences given the provision 
granting the Commission monthly appropriations (on the basis 
of the previous year budget) until the new budget is 
approved.(22) Parliament can only amend non-compulsory 
expenses, that is expenses pertaining to policies not 
explicitly provided for in the Treaties. These expenses do 




























































































and Parliament alone can increase them only through a very 
complicated procedure and not by very much. As the powers to 
propose modifications of compulsory expenditure and to 
discharge the budget are even weaker, Parliament is afforded 
very few opportunities to allocate resources, let alone raise 
them. As a matter of fact, Parliament does not even have 
complete control over its own expenditure, nor does it 
determine the salary levels of MEPs, which is done by the 
member governments on the basis of national parliamentary 
salaries.(23) MEPs also lament the non-existence of a statute 
of the European Parliamentarian. This places them in a 
situation of objective personal and collective disadvantage 
with respect to all other EC and national officials.
All of the above factors do not favour the autonomy and 
the coherence/boundary-definition of Parliament, despite the 
relatively small number of dual mandates left after direct 
elections.(24) An evaluation of the importance of the other 
powers of Parliament entails a discussion of its singular 
relationship with other EC institutions. Parliament has the 
power to dismiss the Commission by a qualified majority vote. 
Dismissal of the Commission would be a very draconian measure 
compared to its effects, and as such it has never been 
used.In any event, the new Commission would still be 
appointed by the member governments. This feature of the EC 
institutional set-up also belittles the legitimizing function 




























































































invest with the legitimacy it draws from the European people 
through direct elections.
The legislative powers of the EP amount to the power to 
express opinions on Commission proposals with very little or 
no impact on the legislative output. The emergence of the 
European Council as the primary policy-making unit has in 
fact weakened the E P 's position, as it has no organic 
relationship with the former body. As pointed out in the 
Vedel report, the E P 1s 'consultative function is impaired by 
the fact that, although the Commission seeks the support of 
the Parliament, it enters into negotiations with the Council 
even before submitting its formal proposals to the latter'. 
Given the paucity and scarce salience of Parliament's powers 
and functions little can be said about its (functional) 
complexity and adaptability. After direct elections, however, 
with the parallel increase in the size of the Assembly, the 
EP has developed a more diversified structure. At the same 
time some of its sub-units, such as the parliamentary groups, 
have become themselves more salient, while the scope and 
number of activities of the EP seems to have also increased. 
Boosted by its new legitimacy the EP has become more vocal on 
a number of issues, such as civil rights and nuclear 
deterrence, having international resonance. The very Draft 
Treaty we are here examining is the testimony of the E P 's 





























































































c ) EC decision-making: Institutional explanation
The main thrust of Spinelli's argument is that the 
Community has to adopt a new Treaty not only to fulfill the 
federalist dream but also because the present patterns of 
inter-governmental decision-making are to a large extent 
responsible for the inefficiency of EC machinery and for the 
declining appeal of the European ideal in at least some of 
the Member States. Spinelli's main motive is well grounded, 
but to find an effective cure for the Community's malaise one 
has to go beyond the 'lack of political will' explanation, 
barring which no solution can be found. 'Political will' is a 
very fuzzy term, and a very difficult variable to 
operationalize. It can be considered as a dichotomous 
variable (either negative or positive), but, probably more 
accurately, as a continuous one, measurable on a scale. 
Although the motives of the national states will probably 
always be particularistic, they might adopt pro-European 
strategies on the basis of some of those very motives. As a 
result of the combination of various pro- or anti-European 
impulses, one could conceive situations where the overall 
'political will' might be neutral or even moderately positive 
with respect to European integration. It does not seem to be 
farfetched to put forth the hypothesis, supported by several 
federal and consociational experiences, that the presence of 




























































































the 'political will' of the various would be members of the 
U n i o n .(25)
A solution to the present problems of the EC might 
therefore be found by trying to see what is wrong with its 
institutions. But in order to avoid the pitfalls of inane 
tautologies, one has to accept the view that EC institutions' 
deficiencies may have other (structural) causes than the 
simple fact that member governments do not want them to work.
The Community is still an embryonic political system and 
it would be naive to expect a high degree of 
institutionalization of its decision-making bodies. The low 
scores for the three bodies we have considered on the various 
criteria of institutional development should not come as a 
surprise. What can be more disturbing for the 'European' 
cause is the trend towards a lower level of 
institutionalization characterizing the evolution of the 
Commission, while the Council(s) seem to have at least the 
adaptability to fill the vacuum.(26) The combination of these 
two trends is at the basis of the decreasing dynamism, 
efficiency and ultimately 'Europeanism' of EC decision­
making .
Unfortunately, as mentioned in an earlier footnote, the 
Huntington/Polsby model gives us criteria to measure 




























































































suggested that the institutionalization of an organization 
might be favoured by activities of its members designed to 
obtain credit vis-à-vis those to . which they are 
accountable.(27) This is certainly not the place to attempt a 
revision of institutionalization theory, and it might be 
enough to say that the legitimacy and accountability of an 
organization must be important pre-requisites for its 
institutionalization.
As we have seen, the legitimacy of the Commission rests 
on the specific provisions of the Treaty and as such the 
negative institutional development of the Commission can be 
explained with the gradual exhaustion of the tasks provided 
for in the Treaty or with their declining importance vis-à- 
vis the emerging environmental challenges (economic crisis, 
technological gap, defense concerns etc).
Strictly speaking, from an EC perspective, the 
Council(s) also present a very low level of 
institutionalization, and their remarkable adaptability in 
crisis situations could be hard to explain. But the 
Council(s) have an 'u n f a i r 'advantage over the Commission, 
which stems from their position between the European 
political system and the set of the national ones and allows 
them to escape the strait-jacket represented by the Treaty. 
If one considers the Council(s) as a negotiating forum for 




























































































governments, rather than as an institution of the EC, the 
picture looks very different. 'The agreement to agree' 
prevailing in the Council might be more than adequate to give 
it the requisite coherence.
The individual members of the Council receive their 
legitimacy from their respective national Parliaments to 
pursue the national interest (albeit disguised as a European 
one). And as branches of the national civil services they 
individually have even more coherence, autonomy, and sense of 
collegiality; in a word more institutionalization. The desire 
to strike the best possible bargain might produce in the 
short term individual policy decisions not radically 
diverging from those hypothetically made by a supranational 
authority in the 'general interest'. But the long-term 
perspectives are very different. The ultimate goal of the 
members of the Council(s) is not the pursuit of a 'general 
interest'. Hence the disregard for the development of 
adequate structures and the lack of complexity to carry out 
the ever-increasing work-load. Hence the inefficient 
operation of EC machinery.
The European Parliament is the 'odd man out' of the 
situation. It is now the only body with continuing 'European' 
legitimacy among those we have considered. As such it is 
struggling towards the acquisition of new functions, of more 




























































































ear ly to say whether this trend towards greater 
institutionalization will be enough to carry it beyond the 
limits of its formal powers.
Summing up, the Commission is probably still the best 
equipped institution to carry out the tasks pertaining to the 
functioning of the Community. Parliament, on the other hand, 
is the only institution having the European legitimacy to 
sustain its initiatives. Ironically, their very supranational 
character has negatively affected their internal and external 
institutionalization in the European Political system. The 
development of both institutions has been hindered by their 
being subject to the rigidity of the Treaties. The very 
precise determination in the Treaty of the Commission's 
competences seems to have denied it the legitimacy to adapt 
to the performance of the new functions required for the 
preservation and expansion of the system. In other words, the 
limits posed on the internal institutionalization of the 
Commission have prevented its external institutionalization 
as well. In the case of Parliament the exact opposite has 
occurred, as the very limited external powers afforded it by 
the Treaties have discouraged any sort of internal 
institutionalization.(28)
The Council(s), on the other hand, have been able to by­
pass the rigidity of the Treaties, thus becoming the most 




























































































in ter govern mental nature has not only given them ad hoc short 
term goals and consequently enormous flexibility, but has 
also permitted them to utilize the material and institutional 
resources of the Member States. Here it would seem that 
external institutionalization might be favorable to the 
internal development of the Council(s), but the picture is 
not very clear. The existence of an institution specifically 
designed to carry out technical tasks has induced the Council 
to elicit the cooperation of the Commission even for those 
policy areas outside its competence. It is possible that the 
structures the Commission has developed to accommodate the 
requests of the Council(s) will give it once more a more 
crucial role, made possible by the internal weakness of the 
Council(s) at the European level.
3) INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE DRAFT TREATY FOR A EUROPEAN 
UNION
a ) The new institutional circuit
If the diagnosis is correct, those bodies having weaker 
supranational inclinations have shown greater institutional 
potential and ability to face the difficulties of the 
Community. The Council(s) have displayed adequate 




























































































resources in order to maintain an acceptable level of 
autonomy and complexity. On the contrary, the Commission has 
been unable to go beyond certain structural and juridical 
limits. The European Parliament could have provided the 
stimulus, the support and the legitimacy for a renewed 
activism by the Commission. But it would seem that the 
existing institutional circuit was unable effectively to link 
together the two more supranational bodies.
Appropriately, the first institution presented and 
discussed in the Draft Treaty is the European Parliament. 
Art. 16 identifies the most important functions of the 
European Parliament in a very modern way. No modern 
Parliament exercises by itself legislative functions, nor 
does it create in its own ranks the executive. Well­
functioning Parliaments (and political systems) are based on 
the sharing of powers with the executive in some issues and 
on their ability to act as stimuli for the activities of the 
executive and as checks on their behaviour. Indeed, the 
European Parliament, as portrayed in art. 16, occupies a 
central position in the European political system. It 
participates in the three main areas of activities of other 
bodies: legislation, budgetary processes, international 
agreements. Therefore, it comes into contact and enters into 
a dialectical relationship with the Council of the Union, 
which is involved, according to art. 21, in the legislative 




























































































international relations, with the Commission, and to a lesser 
extent with the European Council. And since it will have the 
power to conduct inquiries and receive petitions addressed to 
it by the citizens of the Union, it will keep in close 
contact with its voters (presumably through the various 
parties as well).
Moreover, and most importantly, the European Parliament, 
though not involved in the selection of the President of the 
Commission and of the Commissioners, is given three 
important,indeed decisive, powers: over the political 
programme of the Commission, over the activities of the 
Commission (political supervision), over the Commission as 
such. Indeed, once the President of the Commission has been 
appointed by the European Council, the fundamental 
relationship and its working and very survivability are in 
the hands of the European Parliament. From formal investiture 
through political supervision to a motion of censure, the 
relationship between the European Parliament and the 
Commission comes very close to the ones established in the 
forms of pure parliamentary governments, though with some 
significant differences. These will be better appreciated 
following an analysis of the Commission itself.
There is no doubt that the Commission is meant to 
represent the executive in the European political system.(29) 




























































































its legitimacy from the popular will. The (positive) 
peculiarity is that it enjoys a double, albeit indirect, 
legitimacy. The President of the Commission is designated by 
the European Council (whose members, by definition, enjoy the 
legitimacy of their respective national electorates). But the
Commission as a whole will take office only after its
investiture by the Parliament ( that is, by the
representatives specifically elected by the European 
electorate). Once in office, the Commission can be dismissed 
only after a motion of censure voted by a qualified majority 
of the European Parliament. Correctly interpreted, this 
clause entails a shift of power away from the European 
Council towards the European Parliament. In practice, away 
from an intergovernmental body towards a supranational one.
Strengthened in its legitimacy, as long as it enjoys the 
confidence of the European Parliament, the Commission is 
given the opportunity to exercise incisive powers as spelled 
out in art. 28:
Article 28
Functions of the Commission
The Commission shall:
- define the guidelines for action by the 
Union in the programme which it submits to 
the Parliament for its approval,
- introduce the measures required to initiate 
that action,
- have the right to propose draft laws and 




























































































- issue the regulations needed to implement 
the laws and take the requisite implementing 
decisions,
- submit the draft budget,
- implement the budget,
- represent the Union in external relations in 
the instances laid down by this Treaty,
- ensure that this Treaty and the laws of the 
Union are applied,
- exercise the other powers attributed to it 
by this Treaty.
Art. 28 thus recognizes and codifies the Commission's 
role as the 'engine of action'. It attributes to the
Commission the authority, the legitimacy and the ensuing 
powers to become a supranational body capable of dynamic 
initiatives. Of particular relevance is the fact that the 
European Council practically loses control over the
Commission following the designation of its President and its 
participation in an appointment of the various members of the 
Commission. Hence, the Commission acquires a considerable 
amount of discretion in carrying out its tasks - important as 
they are. Having become responsible to another supranational 
body, the European Parliament, a major opportunity is created 
for the launching of a virtuous circle. In the process, the
Commission and the Parliament would act to enlarge
supranational functions and powers. The lack of provisions to 
solve possible conflicts of opinions and policies between the 
European Council and the Commission, though, deserves some 
attention.
Among the mostly vague functions attributed to the 




























































































the designation of the President of the Commission - it is 
not possible to detect the means through which the European 
Council might be able to prevent the President and the 
Commission from undertaking actions not to its liking. It is 
only possible to envisage some informal means of pressure to 
be utilized, such as the formulation of recommendations and 
the undertaking of commitments in the field of cooperation, 
the information of Parliament about the activities of the 
Union in the fields in which it is competent to act, and, 
above all, the exercise of other powers attributed to it by 
the Draft Treaty. It is conceivable that through 
recommendations, the underlining of previous or future 
commitments, and informations, the European Council might 
make it difficult for the Commission, even when backed by 
Parliament, to proceed too far in some areas. However, in the 
final instance, an alliance between the Commission and 
Parliament could produce that virtuous supranational circle 
intended by the drafters.
Only theoretically could the European Council resort to 
mustering support from the Council of Union. This body, 
consisting of representatives of the Member States appointed 
by their respective Governments, will certainly be very 
responsive to the demands, queries, and pressures of the 
European Council. Its powers, however, are limited. It will, 
indeed, (art. 21.1) 'participate, in accordance with (The 




























































































and in the conclusion of international agreements'. But its 
suggestions, its inputs can be easily overruled. Of course, 
the case may be extreme but if it is .so, it will exactly be 
because of its relevance.
Apparently, the Council of the Union retains a major 
weapon. When it comes to the drafting of the budget - 
initiated and submitted, in accordance with the Treaty, by 
the Commission - the Council of the Union may make its 
approval very difficult. This can be done either on the sheer 
merit of the proposals or as a form of blackmail or 
bargaining when the conflict of interests and policies 
between the Commission and the Council of the Union itself 
(or the European Council, since one must take for granted 
that the Council of the Union or some of its members might 
act according to some preference or desire expressed by the 
European Council or some of its members) is very sharp. 
However, in such a case it will be up to the European 
Parliament to decide the issue. It will not be easy, due to 
the predictable ample series of cross-cutting pressures, but 
'on second reading, the Parliament may reject amendments 
adopted by the Council only by a qualified majority. It shall 
adopt the budget by an absolute majority' (art. 7 6. f . ) .
If the reasoning followed so far is correct, then
neither the Commission itself nor Parliament alone are




























































































supranational powers. It is their potential and likely 
collaboration which represents the promise of a shift of 
authority into a supranational direction. No doubt, this 
would represent a major achievement. However, before giving a 
positive evaluation to the virtuous linkage between the 
Commission and Parliament, one must inquire further into the 
way powers can be effectively exercised and, more precisely, 
which areas can be affected by these powers and which areas 
can, on the contrary, be insulated. More powers in fewer and 
irrelevant areas will, of course, represent not much of an 
achievement.
b) Issue areas
It is a well-known contention of the functionalist 
school that efficient performance in one issue area is likely 
to produce spill-over effects. While it is difficult to 
assess the validity of this principle in the concrete 
experience of the EEC, it appears rather clearly that the 
Draft Treaty is not inspired by this principle. Indeed, it is 
well spelled out that common institutions will be entrusted 
'only with those powers required to complete successfully the 
tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States 
acting independently'; (preamble) that to attain the 
specified objectives, 'the Union shall act either by common 
action or by cooperation between the Member States' (art.10) 




























































































each method applies shall be determined by this Treaty' 
(art.10); and, finally, 'the Union shall only act to carry 
out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in 
common than by the Member States acting separately, in 
particular those whose execution requires action by the Union 
because their dimension or effects extend beyond national 
frontiers' (art. 12.2).
The balance between exclusive and concurrent competence 
is, then, not pre-established, rigidly, fixed. This would 
allow not simply some discretion in terms of interpretation 
and action, but, as is pointed out in several instances, the 
conversion from forms of cooperation into common action of 
the Union. However, there is a safeguard clause in this 
process: art. 68.3 'by way of derogation from Article 11.2 of 
this Treaty, the European Council may decide to restore 
fields transferred to common action in accordance with 
paragraph 2 above either to cooperation or to the competence 
of the Member States'. Even though the exceptionality of this 
derogation is explicitly stressed, it appears that subject to 
a unanimous approval by the Council of the Union one or more 
Member States can refrain from 'some of the measures taken 
within the context of common action'. On the other hand, the 
restoration of some field to cooperation or to the competence 
of the Member States as decided by the European Council is a 
powerful weapon against the supranational inclinations of the 




























































































of these developments nor on the manner they might produce 
themselves because art. 32.2 is exceedingly vague: 'The 
European Council shall determine its. own decision-making 
procedures.'
All this said, the issue areas where common action is 
explicitly stated and required are several and important: 
within a period of two years following the entry into force 
of the Treaty, the free movement of persons and goods; within 
a period of five years, the free movement of services; within 
a period of 10 years, the free movement of capital. It is in 
the (potentially shifting) balance between exclusive and 
concurrent competence concerning economic policies that the 
Union, particularly through the ability and the intiative of 
the Commission, might move from cooperation to common action. 
Indeed, writing some time ago in an anticipatory vein, Haas 
suggested that if institutional evolution were to occur along 
the lines of a an 'asymmetrical overlap', 'legitimacy would 
be increased because collective performance would be better, 
provided the evolving pattern of coordination were to stress 
the confluence of decisions relating to R&D and economic 
growth'.(30)
At present, in the Draft Treaty, there is no special 
emphasis on R&D and on economic growth. Perhaps inevitably, 
the number of fields to be covered by cooperation and/or 




























































































probably little choice in the light of previous commitments 
and actions. Moreover, the evolution of the EEC has enlarged 
the number of fields which one way o r .another are affected by 
EEC actions, policies, and decisions. While this is 
definitely an instance of 'asymmetrical overlap', because 
there is a lack of 'a clear-cut division of competences 
between the center and the member units: both share in the 
management of crucial fields of social and economic action', 
action,there is little doubt that recent difficulties in the 
relationship among EEC members are due to the inability to 
identify and assign priorities. Therefore, the shopping list 
presented in art. 53 might not mean much, even though 
necessary. The important step will be taken by the 
Commission, which is entitled, in several instances, to 
define the guidelines and objectives to which the action of 
the Member Sates shall be subject on the basis of the 
principles and within the 'limits laid down by the laws'
(a r t . 28 ) .
Obviously, the most important area of intervention and 
action is represented by the budget. The power of the purse 
remains a very influential element in analyzing and assessing 
the overall distribution of power among different 
institutions. It has been in the past, and in all likelihood 
will remain in the future, an element of contention within 
the Union. Authority on the budget is shared by the European 




























































































with its adoption and by the Commission, which submits the 
draft budget and is responsible for its implementation. 
However, the sorest issues in the past have concerned on the 
one hand the transfer of resources (revenues) from Member 
States to the EEC and their allocation. The Draft Treaty 
contains some innovative propositions. In particular art. 
71.3 'In principle, the authorities of the Member States 
shall collect the revenue of the Union. Such revenue shall be 
paid to the Union as soon as it has been collected. A law 
shall lay down the implementing procedures for this paragraph 
and may set up the Union's own revenue-collecting 
authorities' and art. 74.2 'on a proposal from the 
Commission, a multiannual financial programme, adopted
according to the procedure for adopting laws, shall lay down 
the projected development in the revenue and expenditure of 
the Union'. Once more, the Commission is entrusted with a 
significant function, with the power to initiate an important 
pr og ra mm e.
c ) Institutionalization of EC bodies and EC decision-making
The funds to carry out the activities and the policies 
of the Union are, of course, very important and their amount 
and the way they are collected will tell us a lot about the 
availability of the Member States to contribute to the 
process of unification and to strengthen it. Indeed, the 




























































































together with its new juridical status, of its growing 
potential for institutionalization. Since the Draft Treaty 
contains many provisions designed to .weaken the ties between 
the Union and the Member States, specifically in indicating 
the possibilities of a transition from cooperation to Common 
action, one would surmise that in those instances, the Union 
will acquire more differentiation from the environment 
(albeit with a note of warning: some bodies can and must 
become more differentiated, such as the European Parliament 
and the Commission; others, such as the European Council and 
the Council of the Union will encounter some fixed limits). 
Moreover, one ought not to confuse external differentiation 
with internal differentiation. Obviously, the European 
political system contains potential for both types of 
differentiation. Both have to be assessed and specified.
Financial and juridical autonomy leads to external 
differentiation from the environment. This is further 
strengthened when there emerges substantial 'consensus on the 
functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for 
resolving disputes which come up within those 
boundaries1.(32) While we have seen that, appropriately, the 
functional boundaries have been left somewhat flexible, the 
procedures for resolving disputes may be analyzed from two 
points of view. The first one is the existence of a specific 
body, the Court of Justice. The second one is the provision 




























































































of a delegation from the Council of the Union and a 
delegation from the Parliament and with the participation of 
the Commission, empowered with the resolution of conflicts 
deriving from divergent views on draft laws.
In itself, the EC has shown to possess enough 
adaptability, that is the ability to face environmental 
challenges and to survive and change in its environment. The 
formulation of the Draft Treaty itself is evidence of this, 
at least potential, adaptability. Finally, the European 
political system has always been characterized by complexity, 
that is the existence of organizational subunits, 
hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of 
separate types of organizational subunits.(33)
In the light of the Draft Treaty, which institutions 
present the greatest potential for institutionalization 
within the European political system? There is little doubt 
that the European Council has already reached its upper 
limits in terms of potential for institutionalization. It 
cannot exceed certain boundaries in its autonomy from the 
Members States as it cannot acquire more adaptability. 
Indeed, its very strength, apart from its potential for more 
or less supranationality, is dependent upon its streamlined 
structure and close relationship and perfect linkage with the 
governments of the Member States. Moreover, the functions 




























































































performance any growth in boundary-definition or any increase 
in complexity. While, of course, it may well be that the 
Member States will want to endow themselves and the European 
Council with appropriate structures to counteract the 
enlargement of functions attributed to the Commission, it is 
more likely that a different strategy will be followed.
The most probable and best equipped candidate for a 
strategy against the development of supranational patterns of 
EC decision-making appears to be the Council of the Union. 
Because of its nature, being made up of representations of 
the Member States appointed by their respective governments 
and led by a Minister who is permanently and specifically 
responsible for Union affairs, the potential 
institutionalization of the Council of the Union enjoys some 
favourable conditions. Obviously, its strength will derive 
from its ability to interpret the wishes and preferences of 
individual Member States. Therefore, its autonomy will be 
somewhat curtailed. However, its adaptability and its 
complexity will be determined by the assessment of its 
importance by the Member States. Since art. 21 not only 
specifies that the Council will participate in the 
legislative and budgetary procedures and in the conclusion of 
international agreements, but that it will also exercise 
powers in the field of international relations besides the 
other powers attributed to it by the Draft Treaty, it is 




























































































their representatives with all those resources needed to 
confront the Commission and Parliament effectively. 
Therefore, the adaptability, the boundary-definition, and the 
complexity of the Council of the Union are likely to grow. 
That is, the Member States will have to decide how many 
personal and physical resources they are willing to devote to 
a body which is the most likely to protect their interests 
and to promote their preferences in the face of the choices 
made by the Commission and Parliament. Individual Member 
State Ministers, permanently and specifically responsible for 
Union affairs, will put something of their career at stake in 
this function and will have a vested interest in surrounding 
themselves with highly competent collaborators. The very size 
of the representation will not simply be a sign of the 
interests each individual State has in European affairs, but 
a deterrent against coups de main by the Commission and/or 
Parliament. Moreover, a large representation could be 
organized in a functionally and structurally efficient way. 
If and when this becomes the case, the Council of the Union 
will preempt some of the activities traditionally carried out 
by the European Council and become the true counterpart of 
the Commission and Parliament. Its internal
institutionalization will favour and facilitate its external 
institutionalization.(34)
In order to evaluate the potential for 




























































































institutions, one must engage in some speculation. This 
speculation, though, has to be founded on the one hand on the 
past experiences of the Commission an.d of Parliament, on the 
other on the indications emerging from the Draft Treaty. The 
choice of the President of the Commission by the European 
Council assumes particular importance in this light. 
Presumably his designation, because of the utmost importance 
of his role, will have to be unanimous. It is therefore 
possible that a man lacking a prominent personality will be 
selected.(35) It is also possible that the subsequent 
constitution of the Commission by the President will be 
strongly influenced by his consultation of the European 
Council. However, as we have already stressed, Parliament 
might then exercise some of its powers. Moreover, it is well 
known that the office, especially when endowed with 
significant functions and exposed to appropriate historical 
circumstances, may shape the role. Much will of course depend 
on the relationship to be established with the European 
Parliament (and much on the vigilance of public opinion).
Much more, in the light of past experiences and 
grievances, will be the product of appropriate organization 
and structure of the Commission. It is easy to foresee a
major confrontation of opinions, interests, and strategies
when art. 26 must be implemented: 'The structure and
operation of the Commission and the Statute of its members




























































































speculations may be put forward and related to the outcomes 
desired by those who want to relaunch the process of 
unification.
If the Commission represents the executive of the 
European Community, then its composition ought to be fairly 
representative in terms of nationalities of its Member 
States. Its size should not exceed that of viable cabinets, 
but it should not be fixed by the organic law in order to 
allow for that flexibility that the drafters of the Treaty 
have strenuously sought to preserve throughout the 
institutional design. It is easy to foresee than an important 
choice will be made concerning the structural autonomy and 
the financial independence of the Commission. Its structural 
organization will be better left undetermined so that new 
fields and new problems can appropriately be dealt with, 
again with flexibility. As to finances, it is in the interest 
of the Commission to enjoy an unrestricted allocation as well 
as to be able to draw on funds allotted for specific 
p r og ra ms.
In the past, the Commission has alternately played a 
very dynamic role and a rather subordinate one. Its limited 
internal institutionalization has negatively affected its 
performance, hence its external institutionalization. If the 
President and the members of the Commission are capable of 




























































































devote their resources to a strengthening of the internal 
complexity of the Commission and to exploit all the 
opportunities provided by the Draft Treaty (which, 
admittedly, must be given shape and sanction by the organic 
law), then the Commission will definitely acquire a very 
propulsive position in the overall institutional design. We 
believe that very favorable conditions are created by the 
formulations of the Draft Treaty. Moreover, since an 
institutional arrangement takes shape through a dialectical 
confrontation among the different institutions which comprise 
it, it should not be forgotten for a moment that the 
Commission has plenty of opportunities to enlarge its role 
vis-à-vis the other institutions. Most important, by 
mustering the support of the European Parliament it may be 
able to strengthen the Parliament, while legitimizing itself. 
By facilitating the institutionalization of the Parliament, 
the Commission also creates the premises for a mutually 
advantageous relationship. In fact, the 'engine of action' is 
located in the circuit of this specific relationship. It will 
be the flow of legitimacy and support from Parliament to the 
Commission and of the ideas and initiatives from the 
Commission to Parliament which will give birth and sustain 




Parliament ought now to enjoy several 
a successful institutionalization. The 




























































































apprenticeship period. The awareness of the drawbacks and the 
hindrances to its action has already been translated into the 
Draft Treaty. Other organizational and structural 
inconvénients have been discovered. Above all, however, the 
European Parliament enters into a phase in which either it 
succeeds in creating a sort of self-propelling 
institutionalization or it will be doomed to survive as a 
rubber stamp or merely a representative assembly. In the 
latter case, the risk being of further delegitimization in 
the eyes of too many vo t e r s .
Theoretically, the European Parliament may enlarge its 
scope of support through the activities undertaken by the 
various parliamentary groups. The role of transnational 
parties becomes particularly important. The risk is, as 
several instances of Presidential governments show, that the 
executive (that is the Commission) will represent general, 
probably progressive, in all likelihood supranational, 
interests, while Parliament might become the repository of 
particularistic, probably defensive, in some cases purely 
national, interests. There is no guarantee that this syndrome 
will not manifest itself, especially if the institutional 
circuit were to encounter unforeseen initial obstacles. These 
obstacles could play against the institutionalization of 




























































































First of all, by preventing its full working autonomy 
through a lack of sufficient financial allocations. This lack 
of resources would also make it difficult to move towards a 
clear differentiation from the environment (national contexts 
and national parties, even though in several cases the dual 
mandates can be considered not simply a hindrance, but also 
an asset). Insofar as they are utilized by their holders as 
an instrument through which they can represent 'European 
issues', in their respective national Parliaments they 
constitute a useful component in a complex linkage process, 
which admittedly could also go the other way around. It would 
as a consequence also make unlikely the evolution of a 
process of growing internal complexity. In view of the 
several important and technically significant tasks the 
European Parliament will have to fulfill, the creation of 
appropriate expertise will become an urgent need. Moreover, 
through an increasing boundary-definition and a growing 
complexity and in interaction with the (potentially well 
equipped) national representations in the Council of the 
Union, the European Parliament will also have to go through a 
process of specialization.
Past experiences show that relatively large, 
democratically elected representative assemblies have the 
potential of becoming institutionalized provided their scope 
of support, their exercise of powers and their level of 




























































































the European Parliament enjoys these positive elements. The 
Draft Treaty provides the opportunities for a positive 
outcome, even though many variables are not in control of the 
Parliament as an institution but of the (usually neglected) 
political parties. While we have stressed that the lack of 
'political will' is most of the time a poor explanation for 
structural phenomena - and tends to be utilized as an alibi 
for inaction - in this particular case there is no way of 
denying that most of the opportunities will have to be 
exploited by national and transnational parties. Therefore, a 
major element of uncertainty remains - indeed, it looms large 
- as to the institutionalization of the European Parliament.
It has been remarked that 'from the mid 1960s onwards 
Europeans have tended to argue that majority voting in the 
Council and direct elections of the Parliament might offer 
the deus ex machina for the integration pr oc es s'.(36) It is 
appropriate, then, that after a brief analysis of the mostly 
unexploited potentialities of a directly elected Parliament 
and the indication of the positive changes the Draft Treaty 
introduces for its role, one might turn to the issue of 
vo ti ng.
While it might be true that in many cases, the voting 
procedures and the need for unanimity have hindered, delayed 
or prevented some important decisions, it is also true that 




























































































safeguard of their interests represented by unanimous voting, 
that is by individual veto powers. Morevoer, the persistence 
of the clause of unanimity in the workings of the Council of 
Ministers is less a cause and more a reflection of the 
difficulties of the integration process. All this said, 
however, it remains that the overcoming of unanimous voting 
would represent a real achievement, or at least would oblige 
all Member States to look for effective conciliation 
procedures. The introduction of new rules of the game would 
automatically impinge upon the behaviour of the players, 
their expectations and their inclinations.
In a very pragmatic and cautious way the Draft Treaty 
creates a series of situations in which qualified majorities 
are necessary and required. When obstacles appear and an 
issue - such as the budget - is considered too important to 
be left to a simple majority, absolute or qualified 
majorities are required. This will not simply allow for some 
time to ponder the matter but also to proceed to the 
necessary conciliation of interests and opinions. However, in 
all cases a majority, though qualified, must emerge. 
Legislative deadlock is contemplated only in extreme cases. 
Even then (art. 76:'where one of the arms of the budgetary 
authority has not taken a decision within the time limit laid 
down by the Financial Regulation, it shall be deemed to have 
adopted the draft referred to it'), it can be broken by one




























































































However, a powerful brake may come into being if the 
Member States so decide. Only exceptionally will the Council 
of the Union be required to resort, to the unanimity of 
representations (abstentions not counted); that is only when 
expressly specified by the Treaty. A major loophole, however, 
remains open for the European Council. Art. 32.2 explicitly 
allows the European Council to maintain the principle of 
unanimous voting by stating: 'the European Council shall
determine its own decision-making procedures'. While probably 
unavoidable, this small clause and the way it will be 
translated into actual procedures represent at the same time 
a sort of mortgage the Member States might want to put on the 
process of European unification and the yardstick to measure 
their willingness to go beyond the limits of the past. The 
acceptance of majority voting would represent a real 
breakthrough, made possible, even though not yet likely, by 
the several checks and balances provided in the Draft Treaty 
and which can be activated by the dissenting Member States. 
Obviously, there is no easy solution to this real stumbling 
block, but the fixation of a time limit beyond which the 
unanimity principle will no longer hold.
d) Effectiveness of institutional reform in the Draft Treaty
Summing up, the Draft Treaty incorporates, utilizes, 
gives coherence and clarity to many proposals for change and 




























































































past. (37) But the whole is much more than the sum of its 
parts (and of its intellectual and political debts). Indeed, 
the Draft Treaty is intended to redefine the objectives of 
European integration and to confer on more efficient and 
democratic institutions the means of attaining th em .(38) It 
does so in a way which can be defined at the same time as 
pragmatic and gradualist, and ambitious.(39)
The strategy is pragmatic and gradualist because it does 
not aim at a total restructuring of the European 
institutional arrangement. It tries to provide remedies for 
the most serious deficiencies. In particular, it gives a 
greater role to the European Parliament, legitimized by its 
direct election and attempting to exercise its muscles. It 
overhauls the functions of the Commission introducing those 
modifications necessary for the morale of its components and 
for the obviously pivotal role it must play between the 
Council(s) and the European Parliament. At the same time, the 
strategy is very wary of reducing ipso facto the powers and 
trimming the prerogatives of the Member States. No clear-cut 
break is envisaged with the recent past, a restraint that 
might be counterproductive. Indeed, the drafters explicitly 
stress their intention to 'entrust common institutions, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only with 
those powers required to complete successfully the tasks they 
may carry out more satisfactorily than the States acting 




























































































of interpretation and initiative and action for common 
institutions opens up. Although still at a disadvantage vis- 
à-vis the Member States (who can st.ill resort in many 
instances to the channels of traditional diplomacy or to 
common action within other international organizations), EC 
institutions are no longer formally precluded from expanding 
their areas of intervention, as was the case under the Treaty 
of Rome.
Quite clearly, the drafters are aware of the 
impossibility of starting from scratch and they have taken 
into account the assets as well as the liabilities of the 
existing institutional arrangement. Moreover, they have tried 
to preserve whatever institutional dynamism the existing 
arrangements still possess and to exploit it in the desirable 
direction. At the same time they have squarely tackled the 
critical problem, that of the balance, or better imbalance of 
powers and functions between intergovernmental bodies and 
supranational institutions. Their ambition is most evident in 
the well designed efforts to create an overall situation in 
which functions and powers will be gradually, but 
irresistibly shifted away from intergovernmental bodies to 
supranational institutions, specifically from the Council(s) 
to the institutional circuit created by the mutually 





























































































The hope and the promise of the arrangement so devised 
are that the streamlining of the decision-making process, 
which, however, does not entail any deliberate or 
manipulatory exclusion, will prove to be successful because 
capable of combining elements both of
participâtion/representation and performance. Moreover, this 
arrangement does not contemplate the concentration of power 
in one single body, which would lead to a decision-making 
paralysis were that body to prove unable to exercise power. 
Nor does it excessively diffuse power among too many 
competing institutions, which would lead to fragmentation. 
While some complexity is to be found in the web of 
relationship tying together the Commission, the Council of 
the Union, and the European Parliament, there seems to be no 
doubt that the Commission and the Parliament enjoy a fair 
amount of asymmetrical overlap. This is to be considered very 
positive, if Haas is right - and to say the least, he is 
convincing - in saying that asymmetrical overlap is likely to 
produce positive outcomes. Even more so if, to use again 
Haas' words, the virtuous path between the Commission and 
Parliament leads to 'incrementalist strategies', which 'have 
been considered the engine of action'.(41)
4) CONCLUSIONS
All this said, it is time to come to a global assessment 




























































































amount of speculation is needed. We will keep it on the 
grounds of some well-established criteria. In the first 
place, there exists in the Treaty a profound awareness of the 
past difficulties and the failure of more or less 
encompassing blueprints for change. The difference with 
similar past attempts is that the Draft Treaty is the product 
of an elaboration by the popularly elected and representative 
body of the European political system. It cannot be shelved 
or put aside without entailing a major crisis. Moreover, 
several parliamentary groups are committed to its 
ratification and important personalities have already 
expressed their approval. The Draft Treaty is, so to speak, a 
sign of the times.
However, this does not automatically mean that a shift 
of powers and functions from the intergovernmental bodies to 
the supranational institutions will necessarily follow. The 
Treaty indicates with all clarity the steps to be taken, the 
safeguards, and the intentions. It is at the same time 
flexible, for instance in making room for intervention by the 
intergovernmental bodies at practically all stages in the 
decision-making process, and vague, for instance in the vital 
field of voting procedures. The manner in which some of the 
several unspecified clauses will be filled and clarified; the 
manner in which other clauses will be interpreted, allowing 
quite a fluctuation between intergovernmentalism and 




























































































which the Commission and Parliament will be willing and able 
to acquire, assert, and exercise their functions and powers, 
all will make a major difference in the implementation of the 
Treaty. However, it ought to be stressed that the Draft 
Treaty contains all the elements capable of leading towards 
supranationality in a more or less gradualist and pragmatic 
w a y .
As a matter of fact, the assertion of powers by the 
Commission and Parliament accompanied by a show of capability 
in performing accurately their functions of decision-making 
and implementation (42) and participation/representation, 
respectively, plus the effective institutionalization of the 
Council of the Union, which will testify of the will of the 
Member States to accept a greater amount of supranationality, 
might create the premises for a quasi-federalist arrangement. 
It is not farfetched to anticipate in the long run a 
withering away of the European Council insofar as the various 
Member States will feel confidently represented and protected 
by the Council of the Union. This body, acquiring some of the 
already rather limited functions of the European Council, 
might transform itself in a sort of Second Chamber
representing the States and with some specific voting 
procedures.
It is not simply that requirements of functionality will 




























































































institutional arrangement devised in the Draft Treaty entails 
such a development. The accurate balance of powers among the 
different institutions is designed in. such a way as to 
facilitate this development, even though there is nothing 
compulsory nor ineluctable in it. The institutional circuit 
is capable of sustaining a virtuous dynamic, indeed it 
provides the necessary incentives for the Commission and 
Parliament. At the same time, it can reach an equilibrium as 
it is, without any further transfer of powers and functions. 
A stalemate will be difficult to tolerate for both the 
Commission and Parliament and would probably produce strains 
within the Council of the Union as well if, as is to be 
expected, role and career expectations develop among the 
permanent representatives of the Member States .
Perhaps the weakest element in the overall architectural 
construction is the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
(explicitly mentioned only in art. 44). The truth of the 
matter is, of course, that one cannot have a healthy and 
sound integration process founded on deterrent or blackmail 
measures. However, some constraints against non-integrative 
behavior ought to be foreseen and some disincentives 
envisaged. Another weak point or at least an element which 
might create problems is the openness of the Treaty to
accession by new Member States. In the light of past
experiences, new Members will probably slow down the




























































































element of strength: buying time in order to absorb and 
translate all the supranational impulses) and create some 
institutional confusion. The consolidation of the unification 
process will have to be postponed. Again, this postponement 
might be accepted in order to accommodate effectively and 
positively unforeseen and/or necessary modifications. It is 
the very manner the Treaty is drafted which would allow the 
accommodation of new Member States and the introduction of 
modifications. In fact, the Draft Treaty suggests the 
possibility and the desirability of an ongoing process of 
unification with no specific end in sight.
By far the most relevant objection to be addressed to 
the Draft Treaty is that it leaves too many elements 
unspecified, too many holes to be filled. Some of these 
elements and holes concern important components of the 
overall construction. We have already stressed that a lot in 
terms of achievements and performance will depend on the way 
the issues of the voting procedures, especially in the 
European Council, are solved. Much is also dependent upon the 
way the Commission and the Council of the Union will 
structure their bodies, will recruit their staff, will 
provide incentives, will be willing to test the limits of 
their influence, authority, political imagination. Finally, 
and probably most significantly, many unpredictable 
developments may result from the complex web of 




























































































come into being in practice, particularly in the frequent 
triangular relationship among the Council of the Union, the 
Commission, the European Parliament. It is our contention 
that, given the need for a prestigious designation by the 
European Council and enjoying the prerequisites of a 
potentially powerful and influential office, the President of 
the Commission will feel under pressure to exploit all his 
potentialities. This ought to compel him (or her) to look for 
support from the European Parliament and to establish that 
virtuous path whose treading will lead to further 
integration. It seems to us that the institutional circuit 
contains considerable potential to be exploited. It is a 
quasi-federalist structure in the making and capable of 
overcoming the foreseeable obstacles. If ratified, the Treaty 
will have to be implemented and fulfilled through many 
political maneuverings, political initiatives, and innovative 
behavior. As it stands, on the whole, it already contains the 
necessary ingredients to 'continue and revive the democratic 
unification of Europe': institutional wisdom and political 





























































































1) Altiero Spinelli, Towards the European Union, Sixth Jean 
Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, 
13 June 1983.
2) Just one example very close to our hearts: Article 14 of 
the Draft Treaty delegates to an organic law the 
determination of a uniform procedure for the election of 
the European Parliament. The existing literature, on the 
other hand, provides us with conclusive evidence that 
even apparently minor differences in electoral laws can 
produce radically divergent consequences for the 
political systems they affect. See in particular: Douglas 
W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1967; Richard S. Katz, A 
Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems, Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1980. On the basis of the 
future law, the European political system might develop 
in a number of different directions which are impossible 
to envisage here.
3) Spinelli, c i t .; Our observation on the vagueness of 
Spinelli's motives is only meant to underline the ensuing 
methodological problems. Spinelli's exposition of his 
motives and final aims is made less than crystal clear by 




























































































considerations. These, however, must perforce be ignored 
here. We are also aware that by implicitly defining the 
Council of Ministers as an intergovernmental institution 
we are not doing full justice to its supranational 
attributes (see Joseph Weiler, Supranationalism Revisited 
Retrospective and Prospective European University 
Institute Working Paper, Florence, 1981.) But for all 
practical purposes, and for our analysis, the erosion of 
the supranational features of the Council, as pointed out 
by Weiler himself (Supranationalism, ci t., pp. 36-40), 
authorizes the more reductive definition.
4) The four categories will be termed respectively as:
adaptability, autonomy, coherence/boundary definition, 
and complexity. See: Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Development and Political Democracy in World Politics, 
1965, 17: 386-430; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order
in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1968; Nelson W. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the 
U. S. House of Representatives', American Political 
Science review, 1968, 62: 144-168. On internal and
external institutionalization see: Maurizio Cotta, Classe 
Politica e Parlamento in Italia. 1946-1976, Bologna, II 
Mulino, 1979, p. 285 et p a s s i m .
5) An institution scoring highly on the first two criteria 




























































































detrimental to the European political system than an 
institution presenting low scores on all four accounts. 
In fact a situation would be created where an institution 
would be performing the vital functions of a system (the 
EC) while pursuing the goals of different ones (the 
Member States). For this reason, of the four criteria, 
the latter two will be privileged in the course of our 
analysis in order to assess the potential 'European' 
institutionalization of EC decision-making bodies. The 
quotation is from Polsby, c i t . , p. 144.
6) See Samuel Krislov, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Joseph 
Weiler, The Political Organs and the Decision-Making 
Process in the United States and the European Community, 
forthcoming.
7) See Carole Webb, Theoretical Perspectives and Problems in 
Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb e d s ., 
Policy-Making in the European Community, 2nd e d . , 
Chichister and New York, Wiley & sons, 1983, pp. 1-42.
8) Stanley Henig, Power and Decision in Europe,, London 
Europotentials Press, 1980, p p . 4-5. On the attempts to 




























































































9) This analysis is by David Marquand, Parliament for 
Europe , London, Cape pub., 1979. See also Weiler, 
Supranationalism, c i t . pp. 32-34.
10) Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 32-36.
11) Council of the EC, Three Wise Men's Report on European 
Institutions, 1980, p .11.
12) Although Huntington uses institutionalization to explain
political development, he does not tell us much about 
possible explanations for institutionalization. On 
adaptability he says that it is a function of age and 
environmental challenge. The former attribute is also 
used as an indicator of adaptability while the latter is 
practically dropped in the subsequent analysis (Political 
Order, cit., p. 13-17). This shortcoming of the model, 
however, does not detract from its usefulness to assess 
the level of development of one institution at a given 
point in time, and to provide diachronic measures of its 
institutionalization. On the need for a dynamic theory of 
institutionalization and more powerful explanatory 
criteria see: Richard Sisson, 'Comparative Legislative
Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation', in
Allan Kornberg, ed., Legislatures in Comparative
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Luciano Bardi, Direct Elections of the European
Parliament._____ Institutional_____Development and Power
Relations, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of 
Workshops, Florence, 1980.
13) Three Wise Men Report, p. 50.
14) Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolence of Regional Integration 
Theory, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975, 
p. 65.
15) Henig, Power and Decision, c i t ., p. 46.
16) David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European 
Communities, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1970, p. 242 et passim. 
Many commentators, including most official rapporteurs 
(Spierenburg, Three Wise Men), indicate low morale as one 
of the main factors of Commission inefficiency. Low 
morale is in turn the product of contingent situations 
(such as the relative young age of many top officials, 
which undoubtedly is likely to delay the career of lower 
level employees), and is not explicitly considered in our 
analysis, as our concern rests with factors affecting 
long term structural changes.
17) According to this criterion, an institution must have 



























































































- 6 2 -
of belonging and not be loyal to other organizations. 
Leadership positions must be filled by individuals 
recruited within the organization on the basis of 
universally shared, impartial and impersonal criteria. 
See Polsby, c i t ., p.145.
18) Stanley Henig, 'The European Community's Bicephalous 
Political Authority', in Juliet Lodge ed., Institutions 
and Policies of the European Community, New York St. 
Martin's Press, 1983. According to Henig, 'to all intents 
and purposes (the European Council) should be considered 
as the Council of Ministers in its highest manifestation 
(even if) from a strictly legal point of view it is not 
the Council and does not have formal Treaty powers', p. 
14 and note 16.
19) Christopher Sasse, Edouard Poullet, David Coombes, Gérard 
Duprat, Decision-Making in the European Community, New 
York, Praeger, 1977, p. 96.
20) Admittedly, if the Council(s) are to maintain the present 
crucial role in EC policy-making, they have to give 
themselves a permanent structure or at least develop an 
organic relationship with the Commission. This, however, 
may not be necessary as long as EC decision-making 




























































































- 6 3 -
21) Valentine Herman and Juliet Lodge, The European
Parliament and the European Community, New York, St. 
Martin's, 1978, p p . 64-69.
*
22) Henig, Power and Decision, c i t . , p. 70. On the 
frustration that such provision can cause for MEPs see 
Spinelli, c i t . , p p . 10-11.
23) Henig, Power and Decision, ci t., pp. 82-83.
24) About 25% during the first legislature. We must, however 
not overlook the fact that a number of dual mandates is 
considered by many necessary for the preservation of a 
link between the EP and its national counterparts.
25) Recalling the difference between internal and external
institutionalization, the internal development of an 
institution could give it the strength to respond to the 
challenges posed by the environment (i.e. adverse
'political will') and enhance its position in the system 
(external institutionalization). Such internal
developments though, can only help us explain if not 
predict possible deviations from the original 
institutional scheme. On the other hand, as we have seen 
with respect to the effects of the Treaty of Rome on 



























































































- 6 4 -
institutional schemes could affect individual 
institutions very differently.
26) Not only is the Commission losing functions, showing at 
least rigidity if not dis-adaptability but, with 
enlargement and the defeat of Hallstein's dream to create 
a truly 'European' civil service, it is also declining in 
coherence/boundary definition.
27) See Bardi, c i t .
28) An EP with more powers would witness a dramatic increase
in the salience and in the sheer amount of its business. 
This would not only require a greater
institutionalization of procedures but would also no 
doubt induce a development of the internal structure of 
the E P , especially of party groups and committees. Given 
the multilingual composition of the EP, plenary sessions 
have even more symbolic value than in National 
Parliaments and party group or committee sessions where 
close contact allows groups of MEPs to communicate 
through common languages, have even more practical 
importance .
29) For an excellent analysis of the prevailing situation see 
E. Poullet and G. Deprez, 'The Place of the Commission 
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o p .c i t . pp. 129-240, and S. Henig, Power and Decision, 
c i t ., pp. 40-63.
30) E.B. Haas, op.cit., p. 85.
31) E.B. Haas, op .c it., p. 84.
32) S.P. Huntington, Political Order, c i t ., p. 22.
33) Ibidem, p. 18.
34) And since it has been intimated that a bicameral 
evolution is desirable, the transformation of the Council 
of the Union in this direction makes it both likely and 
useful. See C h . 10 of V. Herman and J. Lodge's book, The 
European Parliament and the European Community, c i t .
35) A different assessment is provided by D. Coombes,' The
problem of Legitimacy and the Role of Parliament', in 
Decision-Making in the European Community, cit., 
specifically when (p. 345) he states that: 'To ensure 
that the executive was led by a figure of strong 
political identity and intention, the governments' 
representatives could be required to make this
appointment by qualified majority vote. That outcome 
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36) S. Henig, Power and Decision, c i t . , p. 105.
37) Both C. Sasse et a l . and S. Heni.g contain useful and 
stimulating discussions and criticisms of the various 
pr op os al s.
38) As explicitly stated in the preamble.
39) On these aspects see P. Taylor's sensible analysis, The 
Limits of European Integration, c i t . , p.. 26-59 .
40) Again in the preamble.
41) E.B. Haas., op.cit., p. 64. Of course, incrementalist 
strategies have also been criticized for allowing too 
much space to intergovernmentalism and delaying the 
process of integration.
42) For an assessment, cfr. Wallace, Wallace and Webb (eds.), 
op.cit. For an identification of fields where the 
challenge cannot be postponed, and ought to be and can be 
faced, see M. Albert, Una sfida per l'Europa, Bologna, II
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